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supply "continuous and adequate service" to Bulverde residents. The
court next considered whether the Commission had the authority to
enforce regulations against GBRA, as a non-certificate holder. The
court found that there were adequate safeguards, both legislative and
contractual, for the Commission to hold GBRA accountable. Finally,
the court examined the regionalization rule, § 13.241 (d), which requires an applicant proposing a "physically separate" water system to
demonstrate that it is not economically feasible to consolidate with
another regional water facility. The court agreed with the Commission
that the Bulverde system was not "physically separate," and thus did not
fall under the rule, because it was part of the "Western Canyon Project"
operated by GBRA.
The court affirmed the trial court ruling and concluded that the
Commission granted a certification to Bulverde, based on its contractual relationship with GBRA, in compliance with the Texas Water
Code.
Kathy Ott
Bexar Metro. Water Dist. v. Texas Comm'n on Evntl. Quality, 185
S.W.3d 546 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding a municipality seeking a water
service certificate under the Texas Water Code could demonstrate the
statutory requirements through contracts and interlocal agreements
with a river authority).
In 2000, the City of Bulverde ("City"), located in the growth corridor north of San Antonio, applied for a certificate to provide water
utility service for its incorporated limits, extra-territorial jurisdiction
and some outlying areas. The City contracted with Guadalupe-Blanco
River Authority ("GBRA") to construct, finance, operate and maintain
a water distribution and treatment system using water from the Western Canyon Lake Treated Water Supply Project. Subsequently, Bexar
Metropolitan Water District ("Bexar") requested a hearing and
amended its certificate to provide water service to an area overlapping
the City's requested service area.
At the hearing, the Administrative LawJudge ("ALJ") evaluated the
merits of the City's application in light of the Commission's permit
requirements. Commission statutory requirements for applicants include: (1) possession of financial, managerial, and technical capacity to
provide continuous and adequate service, (2) capability of providing
drinking water meeting specified statutory requirements, and (3) access to an adequate supply of water. Ultimately, the ALJ recommended
that the City's application be denied, and Bexar's approved in part.
The Texas Commission of Environmental Quality ("Commission"),
overruling the ADJ's recommendation, granted the City's request for a
service certificate. The District Court of Travis County affirmed the
Commission's order.

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

Bexar appealed. The issue before the Court of Appeals of Texas for
the Third District was whether the Commission violated the water code
and their permitting rules in granting the City's application. Bexar
asserted three claims against the Commission. First, the City's reliance
on contracts with GBRA to satisfy the statutory requirements violated
the Water Code ("Code"). Second, the agreement between the City
and GBRA did not grant the City sufficient control to satisfy the "continuous and adequate" statutory requirement. Third, the Commission,
by not requiring that the City prove consolidation with another existing utility in the area was economically infeasible, constituted an abuse
of discretion.
Regarding the first claim, the court found the Code required that
certificate applicants "possess the financial, managerial, and technical
capability to provide continuous and adequate service." Neither the
Code nor the Commission's regulations defined "possess." Through
statutory interpretation and companion statutes, the court determined
no requirement existed of actual ownership of facilities by the certificate applicant. Thus, the Commission had broad discretion in determining which applicants met the statutory requirements. The court
held, based on legislative intent allowing demonstration of capabilities
by contract, municipalities could contract for construction and operations of water systems with river authorities such as GBRA.
As to Bexar's second claim, the court found the City also met the
statutory requirement regarding capabilities of providing drinking water. The court reasoned that a certificate alone does not mean the
Commission approves of all aspects of a proposed plan or that a carrier
is ready to begin supplying water. The court analyzed GBRA's business
history, facilities and customer base in determining GBRA had adequate water delivery experience. The court also found the City's contract with GBRA, as well as the City's liquid assets set aside for such,
were enough to provide long-term water service. In addition, the City,
as a certificate holder and a public water supplier, is liable under any
Commission enforcement actions. Through its contract with the City,
GBRA must also operate the water system in compliance with all applicable legal mandates. Thus, the court reasoned the Commission may
use all statutory enforcement options available to them against the City
or GBRA should the need arise. After this factual review, the court
held the Commission's decision to grant the City a certificate satisfied
the regulatory standards and the enforcement provisions of the "continuous and adequate service" statutory requirement.
Finally, the court addressed Bexar's claim that the Commission
failed to comply with their own regionalization rules. The Code requires that a certificate applicant demonstrate that regionalization or
consolidation with another public utility is not economically feasible
before the Commission grants a certificate for a "physically separate"
water system. In reviewing the facts, the court found GBRA's water
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treatment, storage, and delivery system would connect directly to the
City's water distribution system. Hence, the court held the City's water
system was a regional system under the statutory scheme, and the
Commission was within its statutory right to grant the certificate.
Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's findings that the
Commission acted within its authority by granting the City a certificate.
Matthew Willson
Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Chem. Lime, Ltd., 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS
1127 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a court's enjoining of a statute
only delays its enforcement and does not alter its effectiveness).
In the 1993 Edwards Aquifer Authority Act ("Act") and the Texas
state legislature ("legislature") established the Edwards Aquifer Authority ("Authority") to govern and administer the use of groundwater
from the Edwards Aquifer. The legislature granted a preference under
the Act's permitting system to existing users of aquifer water. Existing
users had to file a declaration of historical use with the Authority by
March 1, 1994, six months after the Act's effective date. Existing users
were defined as persons who withdrew and beneficially used underground water from the aquifer on or before June 1, 1993.
The Act provided that the Authority's board of directors would be
appointed by various governing bodies affected by the Authority. This
appointment procedure was required to be submitted to the United
States Department of Justice ("Department") for administrative preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The Department
refused pre-clearance on the basis that the Act contemplated appointive rather than elective selection of the Authority's board. This made
the appointment provision unenforceable. The legislature did not
remedy the Act's section 5 problems until the 1995 legislative session.
Thus, the Act's original September 1, 1993 effective date and the
March 1, 1994 deadline for existing users to file declarations of historical use, both passed during a period in which the Act was made unenforceable by federal law.
In 1995, the legislature amended the Act to change the board's selection method from appointment to election. The legislature provided that the amendments would take effect on August 28, 1995, and
the Department pre-cleared the amended Act. However, the legislature did not amend the Act's original March 1, 1994 historical use declarations filing deadline, or otherwise address how the expired deadline was to be adjusted.
Six days before the amendments to the Act were to take effect, a
group of local underground water conservation districts and agricultural interests brought a constitutional challenge to the Act in the district court of Medina County, and sought to restrain the Act's administration and enforcement. The court, in Barshop v. Medina County Un-

